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This paper seeks to contribute to the emerging stream of literature on NGO accountability
by drawing on the theoretical assertions of the problematics of accountability. It discusses
how accountability has become problematic for NGOs by examining how these problems
are created and how NGOs subsequently respond. Drawing on in-depth interview data
complemented by extensive documentary analysis, we explore the accountability experi-
ences of Muslim NGOs operating in the UK. We highlight how specific accountability
regimes are influenced by the prevailing political, social and economic context within
which they operate. We suggest this has caused Muslim NGOs to become ‘exposed’ organ-
isations where demands for accountability, framed by security and counter-terror con-
cerns, are limiting their ability to be accountable. Utilising insight from Kearns (1994)
we explain how Muslim NGOs respond to these problems. We find engagement with dis-
cretionary accountability tactics allow the NGOs to gain trust of stakeholders, whilst strate-
gic change processes help the NGOs to anticipate and negotiate heightened accountability
demands. We discuss the implications of our findings for both theory and practice.
 2019 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CCBY
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Increasing attention has been paid to the issue of accountability in non-governmental organisations [NGOs] over recent
years (Agyemang, O’Dwyer, Unerman, & Awumbila, 2017; Ebrahim, 2003a, 2003b, 2005; Edwards & Hulmes, 1996; Goddard
& Assad, 2006; Hall & O’Dwyer, 2018; Lehman, 2007; O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2007, 2008). This research has suggested prob-
lematic implications of prevalent hierarchical forms of accountability, which prioritise funders at the expense of context-
specific and beneficiary-orientated accountability mechanisms. In a similar vein, studies within the broader accountability
literature have also attempted to understand how accountability can become problematic and present other possibilities for
accounting practice beyond its current narrow limitations (Roberts, 1991). For example, many commentators (e.g. Butler,
2005; Joannides, 2012; McKernan, 2012; Messner, 2009; Roberts, 2009, 2018) argue for an intelligent accountability
(Roberts, 2009, 2018) and suggest that more accountability is not always unambiguously desirable. It has been argued that
in certain contexts, additional demands for accountability ‘can become so great as to become ethically problematic’ for the
organisations expected to give an account (Messner, 2009, p. 918). This is an important insight for NGO accountability,
because it acknowledges the ethical implications of greater accountability demands and the possible detrimental impact
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on organisational mission and activities (see Hall & O’Dwyer, 2018). In this paper, we seek to contribute to the emerging
stream of literature on NGO accountability by drawing on the theoretical assertions made within the literature on the inher-
ent problematics of accountability, by specifically exploring how accountability can become problematic in the context of
specific types of NGOs and how NGOs respond. We do this by focusing on the accountability experiences of Muslim NGOs
operating in the UK.
Currently, the UK, and much of the Western world, is undergoing an age of austerity resulting in widespread government
cuts to welfare services and consequently adding pressures on NGOs to fill this vacuum.1 Traditionally, Muslim NGOs have
played an important role in providing oversees aid to some of the poorest regions of the world. However, current UK austerity
measures and the subsequent rise in levels of UK poverty means that many of these international NGOs are now also providing
vital services locally (Benthall, 2016). At the same time, the geo-political climate and rising nationalism and populist politics in
Western countries has seen a rise in a distrust of the ‘other’ (Pantazis & Pemberton, 2009). This has directly affected Muslim
NGOs in the UK (Belaon, 2014). The Syrian conflict and resurgence of militancy in Iraq has placed Muslim NGOs in the UK under
the spotlight, and issues of legitimacy and accountability within the sector are being closely scrutinised (Benthall & Bellion-
Jourdan, 2009; Benthall, 2007, 2016; Cordier, 2009). There are currently over fifty Muslim charities that have been marked
by the Charity Commission, the regulator for charities in England and Wales, as ‘extreme or radical’, and since 2013 there have
been seventeen ongoing investigations into charities suspected of funding terrorist activity (Charity Commission, 2015). This is
of serious concern, as Muslim NGOs play a very important role in areas where it may not be possible for other NGOs to operate
for reasons of cultural proximity. For example, in conflict-ravaged places like Syria and Somalia (Cordier, 2009). The issues of
accountability and legitimacy of Muslim NGOs is therefore a serious concern not only to the NGOs themselves but also to
the wider NGO sector, as well as to political and societal interests, both locally and nationally.
The specific aim of this paper, therefore, is to understand how demands for accountability are shaping organisational
practice within Muslim NGOs. In particular, we ask the following questions. How does accountability become problematic
for Muslim NGOs? and subsequently, how do the NGOs respond to these problems? It is important to highlight, that in this
paper we are concerned with the accountability of whole organizations. In this regard, we consider external factors that may
add to our understanding of organizational accountability. For example, in the context of Muslim NGOs, we consider the role
played by the media to be an important influence on perceptions of organizational accountability. Whilst no charity has for-
mal requirements to the press, an examination of newspaper archives, in addition to in-depth interviews and other docu-
mentary analysis, helps us develop a more rounded understanding of how organizational level accountabilities are
shaped within our particular case. As such, in contrast to prior literature, our endeavour here is not to understand the impact
of micro-level accountability mechanisms upon individuals (Ebrahim, 2003a, 2003b; Joannides, 2012) nor do we consider
the impact of such accountabilities upon the recipients of the work of the NGOs (Agyemang, et al., 2017; O’Dwyer &
Unerman, 2010).
Our findings suggest that demands for more accountability are being framed by security and counter-terror concerns and
are exacerbated by perceived negative media reporting in the right-wing press. We argue that Muslim NGOs have become
politically exposed such that fulfilling their formal reporting obligations no longer serves to remove suspicion and secure
their legitimacy. Utilising insight from Kearns (1994) we explain what effect these external pressures are having upon
the internal responses of Muslim NGOs. We find that, due to this exposure, Muslim NGOs are engaging with various antic-
ipatory and negotiated tactics to deal with these heightened accountability demands. This has led to a push to profession-
alise within the NGOs as they utilise strategic change processes and engage more proactively with political stakeholders
through advocacy and activism. Our findings also serve to strengthen the ongoing argument that accountability systems can-
not be viewed in isolation from the wider societal, cultural, religious and institutional context in which they are delivered
(Hopwood, 1983). Our analysis implies that these issues are even more pertinent for organisations which are politically sen-
sitive, as the accountability requirements upon them are likely to be disproportionately hierarchical, imposed without due
care, and pervasively damaging to the achievement of their mission.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 positions our paper between the ongoing debates on NGO
accountability and the problematics of accountability. Section 3 provides contextual background to Muslim NGOs. Section 4
explains the data collection process and Section 5 presents the narrative of our findings. Section 6 discusses and concludes
the paper.
2. NGO accountability and the problematics of accountability
Accountability is an elusive chameleon-like term (Sinclair, 1995) as it can mean many different things to different people
(Bovens, 2007). In its simplest sense, accountability refers to a relationship in which people explain and take responsibility
for their actions (Roberts & Scapens, 1985). In this sense, Edwards and Hulme (1996, p. 967) define accountability as ‘the
means by which individuals and organisations report to a recognized authority (or authorities) and are held responsible
for their actions.’ This view assumes that a party has certain ‘rights’ to make demands in relation to the conduct of another,
1 Please refer to the series of reports compiled by the University of Warwick’s School of Law exploring the impact of welfare reform and public spending cuts
on different geographic areas. Can be found here: https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/research/centres/chrp/spendingcuts/resources/reports-uk/.
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and to seek reasons for actions taken (Goddard, 2004, p. 345). This implies certain expectations about what this person or
organisation should be able and obliged to explain, justify and take responsibility for Cooper and Owen (2007).
In this paper we seek to add to the literature on NGO accountability. Research examining NGO accountability is rather
embryonic. Existing research on NGO accountability theorises the extent to which, and to whom, NGOs should be held
accountable (Ebrahim, 2003b, 2009; Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2006) and examines the emergence and impact of various
accountability mechanisms (Agyemang et al., 2017; Dixon, Ritchie, & Siwale, 2006; Ebrahim, 2003a, 2009; Goddard &
Assad, 2006; O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2007, 2008, 2010). This extant literature suggests that increasing demands for account-
ability are not necessarily beneficial for NGOs. There is evidence of inappropriate accountability mechanisms damaging
rather than enhancing the social and environmental benefits that NGOs bring (Dixon et al., 2006; Martinez & Cooper,
2017; Najam, 1996; Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2006). The literature also suggests that a dominance of upward hierarchical
accountability to donors, instead of wider holistic accountability incorporating beneficiaries, is resulting in NGOmission drift
(Agyemang et al., 2017; Ebrahim, 2003a, 2005; O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2007). For example, the emphasis on increased disclo-
sure and oversight by regulators and government are often perceived by NGOs as coercive or punitive (Ebrahim, 2005, 2009;
Najam, 1996). Whilst Martinez and Cooper (2017), examining the role played by NGOs in social movements, suggest conven-
tional accountability requirements hinder rather than advance the social change agenda of international NGOs.
Research also finds that accountees are only likely to react positively to upward accountability demands when the mech-
anisms enable them to perform their work better (Agyemang et al., 2017; Ebrahim, 2003a; Yasmin, Ghafran, & Haniffa,
2018). On the other hand, negative reactions are deemed likely when accountability demands are perceived as an attempt
to control or curtail the activities of an NGO (Agyemang et al., 2017; O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2008). Thus, there have been calls
for more situation and context-specific studies of NGO accountability to better understand the broader social and political
context within which NGO accountability evolves (Martinez & Cooper, 2017) and in order to highlight how accountability
can be made more sympathetic to the objectives and mission of NGOs (Ebrahim, 2003a, 2003b). We seek to add to this lit-
erature by exploring how and why accountability can become problematic for particular types of NGOs and subsequently
how NGOs respond to these problems created by accountability. We do this by taking inspiration from the theoretical argu-
ments surrounding the problematics of accountability and by employing an analytical frame, conceived by Kearns (1994), for
considering the reactive and strategic responses of the NGOs.
2.1. Theorising the problematics of accountability
The research on problematics of accountability is largely conceptual and seeks to theorise the problems that can arise
from greater or unambiguous demands for accountability. Although these problematics apply to all types of organisations
and not just to NGOs, in this paper, we seek to specifically utilise insight from this literature to enrich our understanding
of NGO accountability. The literature on the problematics of accountability broadly alludes to problematics as a social con-
struction (Messner, 2009; Roberts, 2009, 2018) and problematics as aporia (McKernan, 2012)2. McKernan (2012), taking
inspiration from Derrida, suggests that accountability holds an unresolved contradiction, as the rendering of accountability
undermines the very responsibility on which accountability is premised. For McKernan (2012), the very notions of ‘giving of
an account’ undermine the morality of decisions implied by individual conduct. He suggests that one way of resolving the inher-
ent contradictions could be to reconfigure accountability through the gifting of accounts. In this respect, the gift is a matter of
responsibility and not a legal or ethical duty. The gift must be ‘our responsibility to respond to the absolute demand of the other,
without calculation (without calculating the return), without reason (without a why), without measure or reserve’ (McKernan,
2012, p. 276).
On the other hand, informed by the work of Judith Butler (2005), Messner (2009) raises the question of whether in certain
contexts more account-giving mechanisms are always and/or unambiguously desirable. This is especially important given
his insight that the accountable self is an opaque, exposed and mediated self inherently limited in its ability to give an
account for itself. Therefore, despite widely shared calls for increased public and managerial accountability, for Messner
(2009), there are certain contexts in which demands for accountability can become so great as to be problematic for the
organisation that is expected to give an account. This leads Messner (2009) to argue that the evaluation of accountability
should also consider the wider context in which it is being delivered: ‘Disembodied forms of accounting need to be comple-
mented with a situation-specific sensitivity’ (2009, p919). This insight is highly relevant for NGOs where account-giving is
usually based around impact stories, rather than on financial terms (O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2008).
In a similar vein, Roberts (2009, 2018) puts forward managerial and ethical concerns over demands for too much trans-
parency. Also informed by the work of Butler (2005), Roberts (2009) calls for a more intelligent accountability while dis-
cussing the appropriateness of linking transparency and accountability. In doing so he does not suggest that transparency
is not important, rather he suggests that relying only on transparency as a form of accountability results in a weakening
of the effectiveness of accountability itself. Taking inspiration from O’Neill (2006), Roberts (2009) argues for an ‘intelligent’
accountability which acknowledges the impossibility of being fully accountable and also considers the ethical burden that an
accountable entity has to bear when it is forced to account in a particular way. In more recent work, Roberts (2018) artic-
ulates the problems that can occur when organisations try to manage exclusively by meeting the demands of external trans-
2 We are grateful to one of our reviewers for helping formalise this.
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parency, with little or no regard to the complexities of operations. This is also an important consideration for NGO account-
ability, where calls for greater accountability usually equate to greater information disclosure based on the assumption that
‘information is power’, with greater transparency seeming to leverage greater accountability. Furthermore, NGOs also have
diverse and often multiple stakeholder demands upon them, but are often limited in capacity to respond adequately to all of
these demands.
To date, the extant NGO accountability research has predominantly focused on exploring how accountability to funders
becomes problematic for NGOs and affects mission delivery. No specific empirical understanding has been developed of how
other factors within the wider external environment of an NGO can also create problems with accountability. Whilst
Joannides (2012) undertook an ethnographic study of the day-to-day practices of the Salvation Army. His study provided
detailed insight into the notions of internal resistance and accounterability3 as a response to the problematics of accountabil-
ity, it did not specifically examine if and how external pressures shape problematic demands for accountability. We therefore
believe our study is a timely endeavour as we seek to explore how the volatile environment in which Muslim NGOs operate (see
Section 3) is responsible for the way demands for accountability are shaped and experienced within the NGOs.
2.2. NGO accountability: external demands and internal responses
In order to conceptualise how demands for accountability are affecting internal organisational activities and processes
and subsequently how NGOs are navigating these demands, we utilise a framework proposed by Kearns (1994). Kearns
(1994) developed a tentative tool for exploring non-profit accountability. This framework is particularly useful as it explores
accountability from both external demands and internal responses in terms of tactical and strategic responses. Frameworks
of accountability are particularly scarce in the non-profit/NGO accountability literature, with the focus of prior research
being explicitly on conceptualising external accountability processes. There is less work analysing the internal organisational
responses to external accountability pressures. Several studies, largely undertaken in the corporate or public sectors (Fry,
1995; Mulgan, 2000; Sinclair, 1995), explain the multiple and diverse ways in which accountability is construed and under-
stood by managers and officers. These studies provide typologies, comprising structure and forms of accountability, to cat-
egorise accountability actions. They do not consider how organisations respond to accountability demands within their
processes, nor do they specifically consider the external demand for accountability.4 More recently, Agyemang et al.
(2017) utilised the Kearns (1994) framework in the context of NGOs: they sought to ascertain whether and how upward
accountability processes can be constraining or enabling in the effective deployment of development aid funding. The Kearns
framework allowed Agyemang et al. (2017, p. 987) to map out how external control processes enacted by funders resulted
in specific internal responses from aid workers. They argue that ‘our mobilization of Kearns’ (1994) conceptual insights enables
us to conduct a more nuanced analysis of the range of possible responses’.
Kearns (1994) provides an analytical frame for considering the reactive and strategic actions taken by non-profit organ-
isations in response to governmental demands in the context of a developed economy. Kearns (1994) addresses controls and
accountability from an organisational point of view, and extensively discusses what managers do in response to external
controls and pressures. In this regard, we believe key aspects of the framework enable us to examine both the internal
responses and the external demands of accountability associated with accountability of Muslim NGOs in the UK. This frame-
work allows us to understand the demands upon the NGOs and subsequently, how they respond, either reactively or proac-
tively, to standards of accountability set by institutions within their strategic environment. These standards can be explicit
(i.e. regulatory or contractual) or implicit (behaviour defined by societal values, beliefs and assumptions).
The framework considers four possible internal responses to external demands, two of which Kearns (1994) considers
tactical (compliance and negotiated) and two strategic (discretionary and anticipatory). Compliance accountability is reac-
tionary accountability in the face of legislative and contractual obligations. Negotiated accountability refers to reactionary
accountability due to changes in societal expectations (Ospina, Diaz, & O’Sullivan, 2002). The factors motivating negotiated
accountability ‘can arise from a gradual shifting of public sentiment and expectations, stimulating action and forcing the
organisation into a mode of damage control’ (Kearns, 199, p. 189). Discretionary accountability is where an organisation
may choose to internalise certain professional standards even when there is no requirement to do so and in the absence
of threats or sanctions from its external environment. Finally, anticipatory accountability refers to organisations proactively
formulating internal standards in anticipation of changing legislation. It also refers to attempts made by organisations to
shape these standards that may eventually be imposed.
In sum, little is known about how accountability can become problematic and how NGOs seek to navigate these problems.
In this paper, we answer calls for more situation- and context-specific studies of NGO accountability, to illuminate the con-
tinually shifting nature of accountability and its antecedents. We mobilise the conceptual notions introduced above to frame
our efforts to understand how accountability demands are experienced within Muslim NGOs. In particular, we explore how
3 Kamuf (2007, p. 253) defines accounterability as ‘‘a counterinstitution of resistance to the irresistible logic of accountability”. Given the ambiguity of the
notions of resistance, Joannides (2012) interprets accounterability as a reflection on the meaning of accountability and the subsequent working response to the
problematics of its operationalisation.
4 For example, Fry (1995) considers accountability from the perspective of intrinsic ‘felt’ accountability and the external conversations for accountability that
can arise from this. Mulgan (2000) considers accountability along the dimensions of responsibility, control and responsiveness. Whilst Sinclair (1995) draws on
the structures (or forms) of accountability (i.e. the controls, audits) and the personal discourses of fear, anxiety and vulnerability associated with accountability.
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accountability is becoming problematic for Muslim NGOs, how demands for accountability are shaped and subsequently
how NGOs respond to these demands.
3. Context of study: Muslim NGOs operating in the UK
Muslim NGOs in the UK were predominantly established during the eighties and nineties as a direct response to the Bos-
nia crisis and the Ethiopian famine (Cordier, 2009; Benthall & Bellion-Jourdan, 2009). Many of the largest organisations have
grown as a direct result of these and subsequent emergencies and are now involved in all aspects of international relief, local
poverty alleviation schemes and advocacy. Today, there are currently over 1600 Muslim charitable organisations registered
with the Charity Commission for England and Wales, with a combined annual income of more than £275 million (Charity
Commission, 2009). These organisations operate freely in the UK, co-existing and often competing with other charities for
funding and resources. Coupled with the findings that Muslim communities give more to charity than any other religious
group in Britain (Ainsworth, 2013), the Muslim charitable sector is one of the fastest-growing areas in the charity sector.
Of the top 50 Muslim NGOs in the sector, the largest has an income greater than £60 million and is also one of the founding
members of the Disasters Emergency Committee [DEC].5 Muslim charities offer the same services as other NGOs and are likely
to engage in ‘activities to relieve suffering, promote the interests of the poor, protect the environment, provide basic social ser-
vices, or undertake community development’ (World Bank, 2001).
The war on terror6 and subsequent discussions on terrorism,7 anti-terror initiatives and counter-terror legislation has had a
substantial effect on the accountability debate surrounding Muslim NGOs. These effects have been both intended and otherwise.
The United Nations imposed unprecedented counter-terrorism obligations on its 189 member states, mandating that they
freeze the assets and restrict the movement of designated terrorists and their supporters (Benthall, 2007; Benthall & Bellion-
Jourdan, 2009). This resulted in the increased scrutiny by the banking sector of all funds coming into and out of Islamic organ-
isations. This added scrutiny had a direct impact on international fund transfers and the ability to ensure that money is deliv-
ered for projects in host countries on time (Metcalfe-Hough, Keating, & Pantuliano, 2015). Muslim NGOs that were not able to
address these pressures, closed or were forcibly shut down. Other NGOs realised the need to become more open and transparent
in their activities and engaged various means and avenues to do this (Cordier, 2009).
In Sweden, the Montreux Initiative was launched in 2005, sponsored by the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs
as a joint confidence building exercise between Muslims and non-Muslims to ‘remove unjustified obstacles from Islamic
charities through a system of self-regulation and monitoring’ (Benthall & Bellion-Jourdan, 2009, p. xiii). In the UK, the Mus-
lim Charities Forum [MCF] was launched in 2007 as an umbrella organisation of Muslim NGOs to engage in advocacy,
improving governance, research and development and providing training services to other Muslim NGOs. As a measure of
their success, a recent survey conducted by MCF found that 88% of Muslim NGOs had regulations in place to prevent the
financing of terrorism and had adopted internal measures to protect against terrorist abuse (El-Banna, 2014). Despite these
measures, 11% of all investigative enquiries undertaken by the Charities Commission between 2005 and 2012 involved Mus-
lim NGOs (Charity Commission, 2012), although they make up only 5% of the sector. The National Council for Voluntary
Organisations has suggested that the Commission is inappropriately entering the political arena, and is allowing the State’s
agenda on anti-terrorism to influence the type of statutory inquiries it opens on Muslim charities (NCVO, 2015). A report
produced by a think tank, Claystone, raised concerns that Muslim NGOs were being ‘disproportionately investigated and
monitored’ (Belaon, 2014; Ramesh, 2014).
In a similar vein, scholars in the fields of criminology and law have noted that the general feeling among Muslims in the
West is one of a heightened sense of anxiety and belief that their communities are ‘under siege’ (Aly & Balnaves, 2008;
Cainkar, 2009; Jamil & Rousseau, 2012). Cherney and Murphy (2015) note one feature of this state is the belief that majority
groups (i.e. non-Muslims) and institutional authorities hold implicit biases about their group (i.e. Muslims) and attribute
negative behavioural intentions to them. According to Breen-Smyth (2014), the discourse and practice surrounding these
biases influences howMuslims see themselves and the attributions they attach to others. Such perceptions can also influence
the way demands for accountability are received, and generate a number of responses, both individually and institutionally
(Uz & Kemmelmeier, 2014).
It is in this environment that we attempt to understand how the unique context of Muslim NGOs shapes their account-
ability experience, and in particular how accountability demands are affecting their organisational practice.
5 The DEC was formed in 1963 as an umbrella group of UK charities to raise money at times of humanitarian crisis in poorer countries. It has 14 members
from leading UK aid agencies and has raised over £1.4 billion since its inception.
6 The War on Terror, also known as the Global War on Terrorism, is an international military campaign that was launched by the United States government
after the attacks on the New York World Trade Centre on 11th September 2001.
7 Terrorism is often used in the context of political, ideological or religious violence, however the debate surrounding terrorism and what constitutes a
terrorist is complex and changing. For an excellent discussion on terrorism as a social construction please see Jenkins (2003). Moreover, Norris, Kern and Just
(2003) also provide an extremely effective critique on how the Government and the media frame our understanding of terrorism.
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4. Methods
4.1. Research approach
In this paper, we attempt to add to the empirical literature on NGO accountability and respond to calls for greater
situation-specific studies of NGO accountability processes, mechanisms and responses. We choose to situate our research
on Muslim NGOs operating in the UK as they act as ideal ‘expressive’ cases (Berry, 2005).8 Muslim NGOs can be considered
an expressive case for two main reasons. Firstly, Muslim NGOs are faith-based entities operating in a secular/different religious
orientated society, suggesting that they are socially in some way different and thus ‘set-apart’ from their immediate environ-
ment. Furthermore, as NGOs, they are likely to be deeply entrenched in social concerns compared to their for-profit counter-
parts and thus any prevailing socio-political factors may have a greater effect on their operations. Secondly, the ongoing
geo-political volatility in relation to their Islamic identity (as outlined in Section 3) and subsequent close links (in terms of fund-
ing, employees, donor base, and beneficiaries) to the Muslim world, has caused them to be more susceptible to calls for greater
accountability (see for example, Belaon 2014; Uz & Kemmelmeier, 2014). Thus, we believe that the Muslim NGO sector provides
a rich expressive case for us to understand how prevailing socio-political factors help shape accountability demands and in turn
illustrate how accountability is becoming problematic for NGOs.
Following Gioia, Corley and Hamilton (2012, p. 17), we make ‘extraordinary efforts to give voice to the informants in the
early stages of the data gathering and also to represent their voices prominently in the reporting of the research’. This created
an opportunity for us to discover new concepts rather than just affirm existing concepts. For example, we purposefully chose
not to use the term ‘accountability’ within our data collection; we wanted to see what terms the interviewees themselves
would use when talking of their reporting and governance practices. Yet, the term accountability was talked of more often
than the terms we chose. Furthermore, we chose to keep the data collection process deliberately iterative and not guided by
any specific theoretical framework in the initial stages because, consistent with Gioia et al. (2012) and O’Dwyer (2004), we
believe that standardising the interview protocol would hinder the emergence of new themes and concepts from developing.
For example, we chose to begin our research with the open idea of trying to understand accountability as experienced by
Muslim NGOs operating in the UK. The idea that accountability was in some ways problematic for Muslim NGOs emerged
from the initial interviews and subsequent interviews then built around this conceptual discovery, as explained below.
4.2. Data collection process
The analysis here draws upon empirical material from eighteen semi-structured interviews with individuals from three
Muslim charities, based in London, Birmingham and Bradford, conducted in 2012 and 2013. The organisations chosen from
which respondents were drawn include two of the largest and most proactive Muslim NGOs operating in the UK (detailed
overview of these organisations can be found in Appendix A). Both these organisations were founder over 25 years ago and
have established formal accountability and governance systems. They also have greater exposure and are therefore likely to
have more specific accountability experiences than other smaller organisations. The third organisation is a smaller NGO
which is undergoing a process of strengthening its governance systems. These organisations were chosen as it was envisaged
the research interest would be transparently observable (Pettigrew, 1988) and would provide a range of views on how
accountability was experienced in Muslim NGOs. Access was negotiated through informal contacts in the first instance. This
was done through email and telephone contact to introduce the researcher and ascertain potential interest of the organisa-
tions in the research. This process took a few months and a total of eight of the top Muslim charities in the UK (based on
income) were contacted.
The interviewees consisted mainly of trustees and senior management; in addition, four external stakeholders were also
interviewed. These included an accountant working for organisation A, two external consultants to the sector and a research
advisor working for the MCF. The interviews were conducted face-to-face with interviewees at their place of work and lasted
at the most 100 minutes. Interviewees were promised confidentiality and signed a consent form agreeing to be recorded.
More details about the interviewees are provided in Table 1. To preserve confidentiality, the interviewees are not matched
to the NGOs.
The interview questions were formulated from prior literature examining NGO accountability mechanisms.9 Therefore,
questions were asked around reporting, auditing and governance mechanisms, and about where the organisational members
perceived demands for these accountabilities were coming from. The specific purpose was to get their experiences and thoughts
about how they viewed and responded to accountability. The questions were revised during interviews as new themes became
apparent (Huberman & Miles, 1994; O’Dwyer, 2004). The interviewing process was conducted as a conversation to make inter-
viewees feel at ease with the interviewer (Shah, 2004).
Findings from interviews are supplemented by in-depth documentary analysis of publicly available documents, including
news articles from mainstream news outlets in the UK, annual reports of the NGOs and parliamentary evidence documents
given in relation to the Draft Protection of Charities Bill 2014 [DPCB]. Information from these documents was used to both
8 An expressive case is described as a case neutralising some functional issues in order to bring to light phenomenon that otherwise would not have been
readily observable.
9 The interview schedule is available from authors upon request.
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identify themes to be explored in interviews and to confirm and enrich understanding of interview findings. More details are
provided in Table 2.
The transcriptions generated 210 pages of data (single spaced, font 12). The field notes and interview transcripts were
initially analysed to ascertain any common themes in relation to how accountability demands were being experienced
and organisational responses thereto. As the data was being collected it was analysed inductively, first by the initial inter-
viewer and later by the second researcher. A set of codes was developed based on the main questions and sub-questions
contained in the interview guide (Huberman & Miles, 1994; Ryan & Bernard, 2003). What quickly emerged was a perception
that some accountability processes were in some way problematic to the mission and day-to-day activities of the organisa-
tions. These codes were subsequently re-analysed and eventually collapsed into the following broad themes: importance of
compliance, suspicion from media and regulator, working under constraints, curtailment of activities, developing positive
image, engaging in strategic change. These themes were both perceived and real and formed the basis of the preliminary
descriptive analysis of the findings. Using these themes, we then sought to gain additional insight from documentary evi-
dence. Specifically, we cross-checked claims made by interviewees in newspaper archives and vice-versa. We undertook a
detailed analysis of annual reports of the NGOs to explore specific reporting and accounting practice. Further, post-
interview we analysed parliamentary debates from the draft protection of the DPCB to ascertain the role being played by
Muslim NGOs in lobbying activities.
Table 1
Schedule of interviewees.
Position* Length of interview (mins) Tenure within Muslim NGO sector at time of interview Gender Interview code
Trustee
Trustee 100 8 years Female 1
Senior Management
CEO 60 2 years Male 2
CEO 90 20 years Male 3
CEO 65 11 years Male 4
Assistant CEO 75 15 years Male 5
Finance Director 65 1 year Female 6
Finance Director 65 8 years Male 7
Fundraising Director 65 22 years Male 8
Communications Director 65 8 years Male 9
Communications Director 75 10 years Male 10
Internal Auditor 60 20 years Male 11
Junior staff
Fundraising officer 35 1 year Female 12
Internal accountant 70 1 year Male 13
Accounts Assistant 25 2 years Female 14
External stakeholders
External Accountant 60 2 years Male 15
Consultant/auditor 100 5 years Male 16
Consultant 75 18 years Male 17
Research advisor 45 6 years Female 18
*Job roles have been changed from the official titles to show consistency and for purposes of confidentiality.
Interviewees:
6 from NGO A.
4 from NGO B.
4 from NGO C.
Table 2
List of documents.
 Annual Reports for NGOs A, B and C available from the Charity Commission website for 2010–2015
 Strategic planning documents
 Policy directives
 Joint committee on the draft protection of the charities bill
- Formal report HL Paper 108 published 03 February 2015.
- Oral and written evidence
 News archives [Online] of the following UK news outlets:
- The Telegraph
- The Guardian
- The Daily Mail
- The Independent
- The Times
- The Financial Times
- The BBC
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These insights were fed into the empirical analysis in order to refine aspects of the preliminary analysis. Subsequent anal-
ysis therefore drew on both the interview findings and analysis of documentary evidence to allow a more focussed theoret-
ical framing to emerge around the concept of problematic of accountability. The iterative process of listening to the audio of
the interviews, re-reading the transcriptions and referring back to the core literature driving the study (latterly focussed
especially on Kearns, 1994), allowed an understanding to emerge of how accountability demands were being experienced
and how organisations responded to them (Locke, 1996). Continual redrafting, reanalysis and interaction between the data
and core informing literature was undertaken to craft the case analysis presented in the next section (Appendix B provides
an overview of the final coding matrix). The empirical findings and discussion section that follows is organised around these
patterns. Illustrative quotations from transcripts have been selected to exemplify themes and to reflect a range of opinions.
The researchers’ own experiences, perceptions, values and prejudices are likely to impact both the research process and
the interpretation of the data, and this is largely unavoidable in qualitative research (Seale, 1999). In addition, there is a pos-
sibility that in some cases the interviewees may have provided an ‘official line’ to their answers, and therefore may not be
fully reflective of reality. This possibility has been considered when analysing the interviews, with the analysis also critically
considering the context in which answers are given, rather than just what is being said (Sinclair, 1995). Reliability and valid-
ity were ensured by making certain that each step of the data collection was documented by the authors and all transcripts
were codified and the codes were used in the final analysis (Bartlett & Payne, 1997). Interviews were transcribed as soon as
possible and then re-checked for accuracy by the interviewers, and interviewees were sent a draft of the final report for
verification.
The following section presents and discusses the empirical findings.
5. Findings
The narrative in this section is structured according to the objectives of the study and the themes emerging from the data
analysis process described earlier. We describe the specific ‘problematics of accountability’ that Muslim NGOs are facing and
argue that formal compliance with Charity Commission requirements is no longer enough in terms of establishing the legit-
imacy of their activities. Drawing on Butler (2005) and Messner (2009), we suggest that Muslim NGOs have become ‘exposed
organisations’, where their formal accountability is no longer effective and is met with suspicion, partly in response to the
climate created by the media. We then go on to explore how the NGOs seek to respond to these pressures through proactive
attempts to counter negative public perceptions and shape future policy concerns. We begin by exploring the importance of
accountability for Muslim NGOs. We then go on to analyse how accountability is becoming problematic for them, which then
leads to a discussion of the effect these problems are having on the activities and operations of the NGOs. Finally, we explore
the tactical and strategic actions the NGOs are undertaking in order to navigate these problematics.
5.1. Accountability is vital for organisational survival
Muslim NGOs have spent the last few decades on developing their charitable identity, and providing a similar façade to
that of Western NGOs (Cordier, 2009). The Muslim NGOs that took part in our research also had similar structures and pro-
cesses to similar sized non-Muslim NGOs operating in the area of international aid (see Appendix A). We find that these
NGOs use the same technical-logistical jargon, mobilise large-scale fundraising and undertake required communication,
both legal and otherwise. For example, all three NGOs were registered with the Charity Commission for England and Wales
and annual reports show that they all follow the requisite reporting and accounting regulations. All of the NGOs viewed
reporting as an integral organisational process, especially in anchoring them within their wider accountability responsibil-
ities. The accountees seemed to view the process and mechanisms of reporting as a legitimising device. Both finance direc-
tors agreed:
‘Apart from it being a statutory requirement, it ensures effectiveness, it ensures proper procedures are maintained and stops any
chance of corruption. This helps us in case things go wrong’. [8]
‘I think it is absolutely key. . . not only to the organisation but to the sector as a whole. These financial statements get audited so
this gives assurance to your donors. . . to the institutions. . . that the organisation is being run effectively. . . and that the funding
they are providing is being utilised as correctly as required.’ [3]
The two directors were very much aware of the need to publish accounts and audited reports on the Charity Commission
website, seeing the associated transparency as an important aspect of their duties. One senior manager noted:
‘You do need to have this bureaucracy [of annual reporting and auditing] for the sake of accountability and transparency.’[6]
Furthermore, all the interviewees were very keen to point out their detailed professional websites, user-friendly public
annual reports and various fundraising initiatives and amounts raised, stating:
‘We were able to raise a quarter of a million pounds. The fundraising has been a very sophisticated marketing technique that we
have employed... very cost effectively and very efficiently.’[8]
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‘I always kept records, even when we were on a voluntary basis, things were happening and I was the one who was keeping the
record of exactly what was happening, where the money was coming from, where was it going to go, etc. So in our second year,
we raised almost a million pounds.’[4]
Two of the three NGOs also had a governance and compliance function. This is expected as many of the governance struc-
tures for UK-based Muslim NGOs are modelled on organisations such as CAFOD (the Catholic Agency for Overseas Develop-
ment) and Catholic Aid (Cordier, 2009). Therefore, Muslim NGOs were engaging in all the ‘‘correct” accountability ‘talk and
action’ that was minimally required of them (Dhanani & Connolly, 2014; Yasmin, Haniffa, & Hudaib, 2014).
All organisations were also voluntary members of various accountability bodies, as is the case with all major NGOs
(Ebrahim, 2003b). Adherence to these bodies allowed the NGOs to engage in discretionary accountability processes.
Kearns (1994) suggested that discretionary accountability arises when organisations themselves take responsibility for iden-
tifying and codifying acceptable standards of practice. This was viewed as helping the organisations focus their activities and
strengthen their internal governance procedures. As one senior manager suggested: ‘they provide a form of external monitor-
ing currently lacking in the sector’. These voluntary membership bodies include the Department for International Develop-
ment, European Commission for Humanitarian Organisations, and the International Organisation for Migration. All the
organisations were also signatories of various standards/benchmark bodies such as the International Commission of the
Red Cross, The Sphere Standards, The Fundraising Standards Board, Humanitarian Accountability Partnership, Bond and
National Council for Voluntary Organisations. Membership of these bodies was a step towards professionalisation for these
organisations (Cordier, 2009) and reflects a need to gain recognition and legitimacy in the eyes of institutional donors and
the international aid sector. As accountees suggest:
‘Our financial audits are carried out by PWC, our program evaluation is carried out by KPMG, so big brands of evaluation that
carry a huge amount of responsibility. We go with them which means tougher evaluation, tougher scrutiny and the end if it
comes out good it improves our reputation.’[7]
‘Externally we are a candidate for DEC membership so we have adopted the DEC accountability framework and we are imple-
menting it as if we are now a DEC member so we have that accountability framework.’ [2]
Additionally, to be seen to be compliant the accountees revealed how they took actions to prioritise the outputs and pro-
cesses required by their upward accountors – that is, the Charity Commission and institutional funders. Thus, oversight in
the form of legislation and funder contractual obligations provided the impetus for improving governance in all organisa-
tions, with senior managers viewing the ‘consequential bureaucracy’ and ‘added cost’ as necessities. For example, all accoun-
tees highlighted how they used sophisticated technology, in terms of software programmes, the internet and the electronic
banking system, to implement and monitor controls over their resources. This allowed the organisations to provide detailed,
technical reports demonstrating compliance.
Kearns (1994) identifies compliance as a tactical internal response to accountability demands that operate as external
control systems. Our analysis suggests that accountees were continually anxious to demonstrate compliance, but also keen
to strengthen compliance by engaging in discretionary strategic actions. For some of those interviewed, the impetus for this
technological advancement and voluntary membership of oversight bodies was a direct result of feeling that they were not
trusted by their upward accountors and therefore must engage in discretionary accountability activities in order to demon-
strate their compliance. A consultant and senior manager stated:
‘. . . nowadays we have to be very careful. Muslim charities especially need to show where the funds are going. This has increased
costs, because there are more procedures, more rules, more oversight now.’ [16]
‘We don’t deal with cash payments and we don’t transfer the money through any source other than direct bank transfers. If we
cannot do that we do not work in that country as we need to leave an audit trail.’ [3]
Our findings therefore suggest that tactical compliance accountability in respect of legislative and contractual obligations
was seen as highly important. Yet, it was being proactively bolstered by strategic discretionary accountability processes,
where the NGOs chose to internalise voluntary professional standards even when there was no requirement to do so.
5.2. The creation of a problematic accountability
This section explores how and why demands for accountability have become problematic for Muslim NGOs. While under-
taking the interviews and analysing the information collected, it became apparent that accountees felt the counter-terror
legislation, and narrative surrounding this, was influencing the attitudes of the Charity Commission towards them. Further-
more, there was a sense that the counter-terror narrative in the media was shaping political decision-making in relation to
Muslim NGOs and consequently this limited or undermined the effectiveness of their formal transparency and accountabil-
ity. In other words, the NGOs felt their tactical reactive responses to compliance were not being viewed as providing enough
accountability.
Our findings suggest that Muslim NGOs have a complicated relationship with the media. On one hand, the media has
always been vitally important for them for fundraising purposes, something both senior management and junior staff
agreed:
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‘Usually the general public is moved more by emergencies in the media. If they are in the media then they will come forward and
give. . .’ [12]
‘The only time these countries get any media attention is if there’s a severe drought or a famine. Prior to that they would get very
little attention, so we are working in some of these countries to raise their profile.’ [9]
‘Some countries are in desperate need but because they’re not in the media and they are not being commonly talked about they
are not getting much funding.’ [10]
On the other hand, analysis of news archives suggests that right-wing media outlets have been heavily critical of Muslim
NGOs,10 linking Muslim NGOs to terrorist funding (Benthall, 2016; Cordier, 2009). The international relations literature suggests
that this has increased in recent time, as the Western world has seen a rise in Islamist-related terrorist activity (Heath-Keely,
2013), as well as an increase in right-wing populist politics, causing fear of the ‘other’.11 This has created a scenario where, as
Said (1997) notes, reference to Islam and Muslims is often news of an unpleasant sort. Some media outlets have run specific
anti-Muslim NGO stories in the past which were subsequently found to have been either erroneous or false. For example,
the Daily Telegraph published a story which accused the MCF, of having alleged extremism links (Turner, 2014). This was
despite no such claims being proven and the MCF itself working with the government on a broader strategy to counter extrem-
ism. This led Ben Jackson, the chief executive of Bond (the NGO advocacy body) to assert this was symptomatic of a wider pat-
tern of un-evidenced assertions being made in relation to Muslim NGOs (Delmar-Morgan, 2015). Subsequently, a MCF-
sponsored event at the Conservative party’s annual conference in 2015 was cancelled after the Sunday Telegraph questioned
why the MCF was allowed to take part. This decision, according to Sir Stephen Bubb, chief executive of ACEVO, was an attempt
to ‘demonise’ the Muslim community (ACEVO, 2015).
There was a feeling among accountees that hostile media reports were affecting their organisational relationships with
their regulator, the Charity Commission. All three organisations have had some form of investigation conducted into their
activities on the basis of complaints. Although these investigations ultimately led to improvements in organisational
practice:
‘We have had the Charity Commission come and do this because we were investigated for an allegation in 2010. In the process
they did tell us a lot of things that we were not doing. We were not maintaining electronic records of our funding agreements.
We were filing reports without reviewing them.’ [2]
‘The Charity Commission said this is not enough, we’ve got to see the [funding] report, if it’s not good then it will need to go
back’. [15]
‘One question was whether we got the Charity Commission’s approval on our Constitution. They also wanted to know whether
our governance includes women. It doesn’t at the moment but the trustees are very much conscious about this and they want to
bring in more women trustees.’ [4]
A worry amongst accountees stemmed from what they viewed as politically motivated rhetoric by the Charity Commis-
sion and a perception that they were not fully trusted by the regulator. Some interviewees pointed to statements made by
the chairman of the Charity Commission, who said that Islamist extremism was the ‘most-deadly’ problem the charity sector
faced, despite Muslim charities making up less than 5% of the total sector. This subsequently led to various independent bod-
ies (e.g. ACEVO, 2015; Belaon, 2014; Third Sector, 2014) stating that the Charity Commission was unduly exaggerating the
number of charities at risk of Islamic extremism. This was an important concern for the NGOs as they felt that overstating the
risk was undermining the credibility of the sector as a whole (Home Office & HM Treasury, 2007). A lack of a transparent and
open dialogue between the NGOs and the Commission was exacerbating the problems further. Thus, it was important for the
NGOs to demonstrate their commitment to transparency and compliance, a desire derived from a long-standing fear of being
viewed as suspect (Belaon, 2014; Cordier, 2009) as well as from evidence suggesting that Muslim NGOs are not as transpar-
ent in their reporting as they could be (Yasmin et al., 2014).
The direct cost an innocent charity faces in responding to a mistaken Charity Commission investigation is also substantial
(Third Sector, 2014). As the Commission tends to report their inquiries into named charities before the findings are pub-
lished, this can cause adverse repercussions, in the form of drop in donations and hostile media reporting, even for those
charities later found innocent. As noted by the CEO of ACEVO giving evidence at the parliamentary DPCB hearing:
‘To give you an example of the problem that was created by the Charity Commission, [NGO X] found two problems in their inter-
national development work in Sudan and the Gambia in terms of fraud. They reported those problems to the Charity Commis-
sion. As a result of that, a statutory inquiry was launched and it was publicly announced. Immediately that raises issues for the
charity in terms of perception. They have had significant problems. That was done during the main Muslim charity-giving per-
iod, which is during Ramadan.’
10 ‘Charities linked to terrorism at record high: extremists pose deadly threat by abusing fundraising groups, warns commission chief’ (The Telegraph, 17 Jan
2017); ‘Government donation to Muslim Charities Forum denounced as "madness"’ (The Telegraph, 23 Sep 2014); ‘Islamic charities in UK fear they are being
unfairly targeted over extremism’ (The Guardian, 22 July 2015); ‘Charity leaders appalled by Muslim ban at Conservative Party Fringe’ (ACEVO, 2015).
11 It is important to mention here that the "othering" of Muslims in the West is not only due to increased violent incidents in the west. The work of
Orientalism by Said (1997) shows the context of media/public /popular/intellectual and political hostile discourses about Islam in the West goes back in history
to before the events of 9/11. Space in the paper does not allow for this historical evaluation of populist hostile discourses and suspicion of Islam to be fully
explored yet, it does help better explain the "limits of accountability" faced by Muslim NGOs.
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A senior manager at the NGO concerned also stated:
‘This definitely affected our funds and our reputation. It had a knee-jerk effect not only on our Muslim donors but on other
donors.’ [5]
Furthermore, there was also a perceived lack of guidance from the Charity Commission surrounding the applicability of
legislation causing the most harm. The CEO of MCF giving evidence at the parliamentary DPCB hearing noted:
‘How can you have access through those people without being listed? You need to give us guidance, because we are on the
ground and it is difficult to see people dying every day when we can’t have access because this individual or this group are pre-
venting us. We do not have any regulation or any guidance to deal with them.’
The accountees accepted that it was important for the Commission to take issues of corruption seriously, yet they also felt
it was vital that this does not hinder their main activity to help those in need. This is especially important given that local or
international Muslim NGOs are sometimes the only groups that can get aid through to isolated areas (Benthall & Bellion-
Jourdan, 2009; Benthall, 2016; Cordier, 2009). All accountees highlighted how they already had procedures in place, in line
with UK fundraising requirements, to stop unknown persons raising funds for them. These procedures included vetting pro-
cedures for trustees and volunteers and specific guidance on expenditure, which had been approved and is audited.
Consequently, we find upward accountability pressures (Edwards & Hulmes, 1996) on Muslim NGOs materialising from
unexpected quarters. In particular, we find the right-wing media and Muslim related terrorist activity to be influencing the
accountability demands upon Muslim NGOs via the counter-terror legislation and the actions of the Charity Commission.
According to O’Dwyer and Unerman (2008), hierarchical accountability favours accountability to those stakeholders who
control access to key resources for both resource use and immediate impact (Ebrahim, 2003a, 2003b; Edwards & Hulme,
1996). In our case, the right-wing media although not a direct accountor, did not directly control access to resources but
attempted to manipulate those that did. Roberts (2009, p. 1549) conceives hierarchical accountability as a form of external
oversight and control where organisational managers must continually strive to demonstrate ‘performance’. Yet, in our case
we found the accountability demands were not perceived by accountees to be linked to their individual performance, but
linked to organisational identity. Thus, apprehension regarding the power of external others to deny possible mission accom-
plishment, a key characteristic of hierarchical forms of accountability (Najam, 1996) was strongly evident.
5.2.1. Muslim NGOs as politically exposed organisations
The main accountors, in a normal hierarchical accountability relationship for any NGO, are the funders who provide
resources and the regulator who ensures correct applicability of procedures and processes. For Muslim NGOs key account-
ability relationships include the government/regulator and the Muslim community [who are both their beneficiaries
(abroad) and donors (in the UK)]. Our findings suggest the organisations believe they are being perceived, because of their
Islamic identity, as lacking accountability and being non-transparent. This leads us to suggest that Muslim NGOs view them-
selves as politically vulnerable organisations. The accountees in Muslim NGOs believe the accounts they provide, either to
the regulator or the media, are viewed as incomplete and unconvincing. This is particularly important given that Pantazis
and Pemberton (2009) note the Muslim community largely views government rhetoric with suspicion due to ever-
increasing legislation perceived to be targeting the community. Accountees also expressed these sentiments and suggested
that Muslim NGOs have to be increasingly careful who they interact with, especially within the Muslim community, and this
is having an impact on their recruitment and donations:
‘We are now moving towards a system where we are doing criminal record checks on people: For all volunteers and wherever
possible and wherever needed.’ [3]
‘We even have a system where any donor that gives more than £5000, straightaway we have to do a CTF check. That’s counter-
terrorism and fraud, as we have to check to see the money is legitimate.’ [13]
We therefore present the notion that Muslim NGOs are becoming exposed organisations. We suggest that demands for
accountability, coming from counter–terror legislation and a politically motivated regulator are influenced by an anti-
Muslim rhetoric. This rhetoric is shaped by wider Muslim-related terror concerns and the right-wing media. This is creating
a problematic accountability for Muslim NGOs. Thus, while they meet their formal accountability requirements, this does not
satisfy or reassure their critics in the press. Butler (2005) suggests an exposed self is likely to engage in an abundance of
account-giving activities. The problematics of accountability arise because the account is received with scepticism and
viewed as being incomplete (Messner, 2009). According to Butler (2005), the exposed nature of these organisations means
they are closely scrutinised, their behaviour and activities are commented upon, and whatever they say and do is received
with scepticism. In a similar vein, our findings suggest that Muslim NGOs, operating within the current socio-political dis-
course, which views their Islamic identity with suspicion, can become politically exposed to such limitations and therefore
the normal routines of accountability no longer serve to satisfy or appease the regulator, or reassure the public. This suggests
accountability demands are of a differing nature for Muslim NGOs than for similar non-Muslim NGOs. We now turn to ana-
lysing the effect these demands are having upon the organisational practice of Muslim NGOs.
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5.3. Problematics of accountability in action: effect on activities and operations
The findings of this study suggest a number of areas where the demands for greater accountability, brought on by
counter-terror legislation, were having a detrimental effect on the activities and internal operations of Muslim NGOs. Mus-
lim NGOs by their very nature tend to operate in Muslimmajority areas, and arguably areas which also have the greatest risk
(Benthall, 2016). The wider climate of suspicion and ongoing legislative changes, as discussed earlier, are also having a detri-
mental impact on what they can and cannot do. For example, global and national policy-makers in the United Nations,
national Treasury Departments, and in particular the Financial Action Task Force, suggest the not-for-profit sector is partic-
ularly vulnerable to abuse by terrorists (FATF, 2014).
The organisations interviewed expressed huge frustration with the various anti-terror legislative regulations, with man-
agers and trustees stating it is a:
‘logistical, legal and financial nightmare dealing with those measures’ [1] and
‘I think counter-terrorism legislation is preventing us from having access to the neediest people’ [4].
This suggests that the legislation was not only affecting their internal operation but also their humanitarian activities. Our
findings suggest that the main concerns are linked to the uncertainty in the wording of the legislation and its subsequent
applicability to NGO operations.
The Terrorism Act 2000 and its subsequent amendments sets out offences which could be deemed to be committed when
meeting representatives from organisations designated under the Act. According to those giving evidence at the parliamen-
tary DPCB hearing, the territorial applications of the Act are unclear and could be interpreted very broadly.12 In particular, the
Chief Executive of Bond suggests that the uncertainties can have a ‘chilling effect’ on the choices made by NGOs who might
come into contact with such groups. The UK Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation (2014) recognises that charities
are likely to come into contact with terrorist groups even while acting legitimately. For example, interviewees suggested this
could happen when they are delivering aid to areas where certain groups may have political and military control or, in situations
when they are delivering life-saving aid, there is a risk that some of those receiving aid includes individuals who have been
designated as terrorists, or who have links to designated individuals or groups. As the CEO of the MCF and Chief Executive
of Bond both note in the parliamentary DPCB hearing:
‘There are proscribed groups in those areas, and we know them. They are the gatekeepers. How can we go through the gatekeep-
ers to reach the neediest people in Syria, Somalia or different parts of the world? This is very important.’
And an external stakeholder also suggested:
‘If you are working in Gaza and you are taking anything in through the crossings, you have to take account of Israeli authorities
and the authorities in Gaza. The authorities in Gaza are Hamas; that is just a fact of life.’ [17]
Furthermore, our analysis suggests that other operational limitations specific to Muslim NGOs have come in the form of
restricted access to financial services. To comply with counter-terrorism regulations, UK banks have engaged in risk manage-
ment strategies and de-risking activities. De-risking refers to the practice of financial institutions exiting relationships with
and closing the accounts of clients perceived to be ‘high risk.’ Rather than manage these risky clients, financial institutions
opt to end the relationship altogether, consequently minimising their own risk exposure while leaving clients bankless
(Durner & Shetret, 2015). Analysis of news archives suggests this practice has had a tremendous effect on Muslim specific
individuals and organisations,13 and particularly on the NGO sector as many Muslim NGOs operate in high risk regions. It
has therefore become increasingly challenging for Muslim NGOs to transfer funds for humanitarian work through formal bank-
ing channels to support operations abroad, with accountees noting:
‘We truly understand the importance of this but the nature of our work sometimes needs us to respond quickly to the events to
save lives. . .the funds need to reach them during the most crucial time when it is needed.’ [11]
‘For the past 10 years this has had a significant impact in terms of finance for Islamic Muslim charities more than it has on other
charities. Being Islamic or Muslim in orientation means funds coming in and going out of the organisation would face more scru-
tiny from the banking sector than others.’ [18]
NGO A, specifically, was affected by this issue when their accounts were closed by HSBC without warning in early 2016.
This resulted in them stating on their website:
‘UK payments to others who bank with HSBC were held up for weeks or even months – including a payment to procure tents
urgently for earthquake victims in Nepal. And a number of donors who bank with HSBC had donations to [Org A] blocked.’
12 For example, terrorist property is defined very broadly as ‘money or other property which is likely to be used for the purpose of terrorism’ (s. 14).
13 See for example: ‘‘Second Muslim charity has bank accounts closed by HSBC” (The Third Sector, 30 Jul 2014); ‘‘Why banks like HSBC won’t send money to
war-zone charities” (Bloomberg News, 11 May 2016); ‘‘Banks block charity donations over terrorism funding fears” (The Guardian, 5 Mar 2015); ‘‘A crackdown
on financial crime means global banks are de-risking”, (The Economist, 8 July 2017).
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As they had already been made aware of HSBC’s reluctance to provide service to them, NGO A had already moved the
majority of its banking to another financial services provider in the preceding year. These developments are particularly
detrimental, because they not only damage the activities and operations of those organisations affected but they also expose
donor assets to greater risk, as highlighted by Bond to the parliamentary DPCB hearing:
‘If NGOs cannot transfer funds to ‘high risk’ destinations then informal mechanisms – use of money service bureaux (MSBs), or
carrying cash across borders – will replace the safer and more transparent transfer of funds through the banking system. . ..’
In some cases, it is alleged this had also led to a direct loss of life:
‘In the Somali famine in 2011, we heard . . .. that they lost 260,000 people. This was because of the bank restrictions. It didn’t
happen in the famine before that.’ [CEO of MCF giving evidence to the parliamentary DPCB hearing]
Representatives at the parliamentary DPCB hearing also expressed unease at the way in which organisations were singled
out for de-risking checks, as both individuals and organisations are usually checked against:
‘formal and informal counter-terrorism lists, media reports etc in the UK and overseas. A charity will be treated as suspect if
mentioned in an unproved media report, a Charity Commission warning, an overseas government’s listing of a UK
Government-funded charity etc. There is no effective appeal against this.’ [Bond representative]
A recent report by the BBC (2015) found a standard software ‘World-check’ (owned by Thomson) is used by 49 out of the
50 British Banks to screen their customers. However, serious concerns were raised in this report over the reliability of the
sources used by the software. This has been given more precedence in recent years as the financial and reputational costs
of being complicit in such cases are huge for the banks concerned. Kearns (1994) discusses anticipatory/positioning account-
ability as involving agents anticipating the formulation of new standards in order to better position themselves for compli-
ance. In our case, the accountees suggest that they are not able to comply even if they were able to anticipate a change, due
to them not being trusted (Messner, 2009).
Given these concerns, we also find there is still much work to be done on behalf of the NGOs themselves to reduce their
internal risk and thereby anticipate accountability pressures. Although all accountees discussed risk management, and have
risk management policies in place, we found poor understanding of the risk of reducing imitation and fake volunteer cash
collections. This could be because such issues are difficult to fully manage and control. For example, accountees in NGO B
highlighted how it had recently had its name cleared in a terrorist funding related enquiry, where individuals had used their
name to raise funds for suspected terrorist activity. The organisation itself notified the police after it was made aware of this.
The organisation was subsequently named in the media as ‘supporting terrorist causes’ before the enquiry had concluded,
which resulted in a substantial loss of income for them. Senior management stated:
‘It was very difficult because we lost a lot of income and funding.’ [2]
‘It was guilty until proven innocent.’ [6]
The organisation was later fully cleared of any wrongdoing. The accountees were keen to highlight that they have since
tightened their volunteer registration rules and do not engage in street cash collections any more. Risks associated with
fraudulent fundraising and imitation can be difficult to mitigate for any NGO which deals with cash fundraising; this is
despite adhering to the specific rules set by the fundraising standard body to mitigate common risks associated with such
collections (Benthall, 2016). One thing that perhaps could be done by Muslim NGOs is to have a publicised blanket ban on
allowing fundraising by individuals in the name of the organisation. A specific focus on only large-scale fundraising initia-
tives may help to counter this risk. However, the charities may then be in danger of losing out on substantial donor income
that comes from impromptu donations.
Our analysis suggests that the issues highlighted here seem to be particular to Muslim NGOs compared to other faith-
based NGOs. As research in this area is particularly scarce, it is difficult to state this with certainty. Muslim NGOs themselves
are aware of the unique position they are in and there was a realisation among the accountees for a need to undertake top-
down strategic change in their mission and governance boards to ensure they were able to handle external pressures and
overcome these problems specific to the Muslim NGO sector. Continuing this discussion, the following section outlines
how the NGOs have engaged with various strategic and tactical measures in an attempt to overcome these difficulties
and move to building trust and influence.
5.4. Negotiating and anticipating accountability: steps towards building trust and influence
The organisations were found to be active in trying to manage the external perceptions on the Muslim NGO sector
through various negotiatory and anticipatory processes. For example, to counter their negative image, reputational concerns
were found to be prominent among accountees, with all organisations having a PR/Media relations person/department to
specifically deal with media-related queries as an attempt to influence the ways in which they were being represented.
Kearns (1994) suggests negotiated accountability processes arise when implicit accountability standards emerge from shift-
ing societal expectations, thereby allowing for some reactive, tactical actions through negotiation regarding the standards to
which organisations will be held to account (Agyemang et al., 2017). Consequently, organisational members stated how they
were much more aware of the need to prove their transparency and accountability:
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‘We are currently doing a mini campaign, trying to address all the negative stories through our publications, etc.’ [10]
‘Because we’re Islamic. . . it’s a double edged sword. Being Islamic means you get greater scrutiny but it also means you can work
in areas where other charities can’t work.’ [11]
Thus, the organisations were choosing to become more proactive in formulating their public image. Processes linked to
negotiating accountability were therefore linked to gaining political and media approval.
The organisations were also found to be building closer relationships with the government and regulator. Enacting fund-
ing partnerships with large funder bodies, including the UN and the DEC, and maintaining close relations with the Depart-
ment for International Development was an important factor in this process, as it allowed them to anticipate accountability
demands to a degree (Kearns, 1994). This was seen to be very important for the organisations as it allowed them a measure
of stability in the politically volatile environment. For example, one senior manager noted:
‘We have been the government’s favourite both Labour and Conservative which means we’ve transcended past the politics of it.
It means that institutionally we believe we have an operation that can withstand environment and political changes.’[3]
To do this, the organisation was regularly represented at (and very often invited to) functions and other networking
events where key people in power would also be in attendance. Reciprocally, the organisations also invited local MPs and
people who they felt portrayed a positive image of the organisation, to their headquarters. These visits were then highlighted
on their website and in the local media, as even a junior staff members noted:
‘We have relations here with Downing Street, a lot of the key MPs, Prince Charles etc.’ [12]
This points to a deliberate strategy on part of both parties to engage each other, with the government in exchange being
viewed as not hostile to the Muslim community (Pantazis & Pemberton, 2009). Having said this, accountees were at pains to
point out that they did not engage in politically motivated activities at the operational level. In-fact all NGOs had refused to
take government funding as part of the ‘Prevent’ initiative. This funding was provided to organisations to stem the threat of
extremism but has been viewed with great suspicion since its inception. Thus, both trustees and senior managers note:
‘When the Prevent strategy came, not only did we not get the funding, we refused to apply for it. We did not even engage with it
because of its political nature and security agenda.’ [5]
‘A lot of government funding is more of a political nature – such as Prevent. This is not something we would even look to apply
for.’ [11]
This seems partly to appease the wider Muslim community and is evidence of tension between the government and the
wider Muslim community, some of whom view the government with extreme suspicion (Pantazis & Pemberton, 2009). Thus,
while the organisations were willing to engage with various strategic and tactical responses, they would not do so if it felt it
would harm their mission or their relationship with the Muslim community.
The extent to which Muslim NGOs organisations effectively managed their relationships with political players was found
to be dependent on their strategic focus. All of the NGOs taking part in the study were in different stages of organisational re-
structure as a direct response to the changing political and societal environment. This involved the changing of strategy as
well as organisational roles and responsibilities:
‘Our strategy has shifted from a voluntary based to a proper organisational charity with a proper infrastructure.’ [4]
‘Our strategy change process was a two-year process which involved outside stakeholder engagement; what others thought
about us, from the government, to DFID [the Department for International Development], peers, Christian Aid, Oxfam. . .’. [3]
Accountees noted a big push to move into advocacy-related areas. This would not only enable them to maintain closer
links with political stakeholders but also allow them a voice on issues that affected the Muslim NGOs directly. Building trust
is an important precursor to gaining influence and creating these links was seen as imperative before offering suggestions for
change (Agyemang et al., 2017). While Kearns (1994) discusses anticipatory/positioning accountability processes as helping
organisations position themselves for compliance, we find the accountees were engaging in anticipatory accountability pro-
cesses to also give them greater influence:
‘The whole sector has changed and we need to think at a different level. It’s no longer ‘here’s my money, and help the needy’. . .
People have to start thinking beyond this.’ [3]
‘Previously, prior to the current strategy, advocacy was not a big player but now advocacy and campaigning are key to moving
the whole sector. . . to making real change.’ [10]
‘What we realised was for us to be received, be recognised in the media, we had to say something unique.’ [5]
Thus, strategic change supported by stakeholders was seen as necessary to maintain closer relationship with DFID and the
government. This campaigning is itself a mechanism for NGO accountability, providing a new means for being heard, and
improving their situation (Bendell, 2000). For example, all accountees stated they had initiated dialogue with government
contacts and engaged in lobbying to see if the impact of the counter-terror legislation could be reduced for NGOs. Although
this raises policy issues related to the rights and abilities of NGOs to monitor emerging legislation and lobby for favourable
outcomes (Hayman et al., 2013), lobbying and activism were deemed important for the NGOs taking part in the study.
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Some accountees suggested that undertaking joint activist activities through umbrella organisations, such as the MCF,
could help the Muslim NGO sector collectively engage with negotiated and anticipatory tactics. The MCF is an umbrella
organisation for Muslim NGOs/charities. They meet every few months to initiate various training and development pro-
grammes for their members, as well as working closely with the Charity Commission (MCF, 2015). A transparency and gov-
ernance subcommittee was also recently set up to help members strengthen their reporting and accountability procedures.
Although this forum is still at an early stage of development, it could play an instrumental role in helping Muslim NGOs
engage collectively with joint issues of concern for the sector. Simons (2005) suggests that, if responsibility for decision-
making is shared among several people, not only is this likely to increase the information content of the decision made,
but it also strengthens the commitment of each person to the decided course of action. If they are able to use advocacy
to shape emergent external accountability demands, this can be extremely important in helping Muslim NGOs mediate
accountability (Messner, 2009).
6. Discussion and conclusion
NGOs provide crucial aid delivery to areas of greatest humanitarian need. In the present age this need includes both areas
of natural crisis and man-made crisis. Due to their religious and/or cultural affiliations, Muslim NGOs are often better placed
to access areas of the world where other NGOs have difficulty in operating. Muslim NGOs also have a comparative advantage
because of their long-term presence in areas where, at least until recently, few organisations worked. However, due to the rise
in terrorist-related activity originating from these areas, and the wider volatile socio-political environment, these NGOs have
become the focus of extra scrutiny and suspicion. The specific aim of this paper was therefore to understand how demands for
accountability were shaping organisational practice within Muslim NGOs. Our findings suggest Muslim NGOs place a strong
emphasis on accountability and transparency, where compliance accountability processes in the form of Charity Commission
reporting requirements and funder specific formal and informal processes, are being supplemented with strategic discre-
tionary processes of accountability. However, our findings also provide a number of insights into how accountability is
becoming problematic for Muslim NGOs and how demands for accountability are shaping organisational practice.
First, we find demands for accountability, whilst still emanating from upward accountors, going beyond accounting and
reporting concerns. Compared to prior studies (Agyemang et al., 2017; Ebrahim, 2003a, 2003b; O’Dwyer and Unerman,
2008) we find Muslim NGOs have a much more complex set of external pressures to manage than other similar NGOs. Our
findings suggest the Charity Commission has been adversely influenced by the right wing media and Muslim related terrorist
concerns and as a result has been accused of giving undue attention to Muslim NGOs. In this regard the media serves to influ-
ence the accountability debate. Consequently, our case analysis also suggests problemswith accountability do not necessarily
need to be caused by direct demands for accountability. For example, requirements from the counter terrorism legislation,
although not directly aimed at Muslim NGOs have had an adverse effect on NGO financial and operational activities, due
to their affiliation with theMuslim community and activities in high-risk geographical areas. This insight develops our under-
standing of how specific NGO accountability regimes are influenced by the prevailing political, social and regulatory context.
Second, we suggest for Muslim NGOs, the normal routines of accountability no longer serve to satisfy or appease the reg-
ulator, or reassure the public. In this respect, we argue thatMuslimNGOs have become politically exposed organisations, such
that they are perceived negatively with suspicion and distrust due to their Muslim identity14. Exposed organisations are likely
to face increasingly onerous accountability demands, which nevertheless will fail to satisfy, or resolve the suspicion. This means
their accounts will always be received with scepticism and viewed as being incomplete (Messner, 2009). For Butler (2005, p. 91),
one cannot really account for this exposure; it becomes a ‘burden’ that the self cannot negotiate away. This insight adds an extra
dimension to our current understanding of how upward accountability demands can become overly burdensome. In addition,
this insight questions the purpose of routine account-giving activities if they cannot satisfy the accountor. Subsequently, in trying
to meet this impossible condition, Muslim NGOs were moving beyond compliance to the proactive management of accountabil-
ity relationships through engagement with various discretionary, negotiated and anticipatory accountability processes. This
included enacting strategic change, becoming more proactive in formulating their public image, attempting to build closer rela-
tionships with the government and regulator, and actively engaging in lobbying and advocacy campaigns. Thus, whilst on one
hand our findings suggest meeting conditions of accountability can be impossible for exposed organizations, we also highlight
the proactive steps being taken by such organisations to mitigate or limit the effect of their exposure.
This paper contributes to both the theoretical debate surrounding the problematics of accountability and to the NGO
accountability literature. Little is known about how accountability can become problematic and how NGOs in particular seek
to navigate these problems. The paper adds to the theoretical debate on the problematics of accountability by articulating
how socio-political narratives and populist politics/rhetoric can influence the conversations surrounding accountability
14 This is a reflection of the current political climate both in the UK, Europe and US, where being Muslim itself is cause for suspicion. For example, media
coverage surrounding the refugee crisis has been unduly focused on the religion of the migrants rather than their humanitarian needs. Said (1997) argues that
this type of coverage of Islam is not actually interpretation but rather an assertion of power. As knowledge and coverage of the Islamic world and Muslims is
defined by geopolitics and economic interests, this corresponds to a general understanding of Islam, Muslims and by extension Muslim specific organisations,
being not what they actually are, but what ‘‘prominent sectors of a prevalent society take it [them] to be” (Said, 1997, p144). According to Pantazis and
Pemberton (2009) the current political discourse has designated Muslims as the new ‘enemy within’ thereby facilitating the construction of Muslims as a
suspect community.
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for particular types of organisations. We present the notion of an exposed organisation (Messner, 2009) as one which is per-
ceived negatively with suspicion and distrust. In doing so, we bring new insight into the debate on NGO accountability by
arguing that accountability can become problematic for exposed NGOs due to the prevailing socio-political environment in
which they operate. We thus build on prior research on NGO accountability by responding to calls to extend examination of
accountability within different socio-cultural organisational contexts (see Ebrahim, 2003a, 2003b, 2009; Hall & O’Dwyer,
2018; Hopwood, 1983; Martinez & Cooper, 2017). Our findings serve to strengthen the ongoing argument that accountability
systems cannot be viewed in isolation from the wider societal, cultural, religious and institutional contexts in which they are
delivered. Our findings imply that these issues are even more important, and perhaps much more so, for organisations who
are considered ‘exposed’ because the accountability requirements upon them are disproportionately damaging their mission
and activities.
The paper further adds to the understanding of the continually shifting nature of NGO accountability (O’Dwyer &
Boomsma, 2015) and the detrimental nature of upward accountability demands (Ebrahim, 2003a, 2003b, 2009; O’Dwyer
& Unerman, 2007, 2008, 2010) by revealing the extent to which exposed NGOs must act to prove their accountability. We
consider the wider social and political context within which demands for NGO accountability evolve (Martinez & Cooper,
2017). We suggest there is a need for more intelligent accountability, which recognises the pursuit of justice and fairness
in accounting and accounting regulation (McKernan & Kosmala, 2007). In this regard, we argue the Charity Commission,
as the regulator of NGOs in the UK, needs to engage more closely with the moral and ethical dimensions of the account it
demands (McKernan, 2012; Messner, 2009). Consequently, as both Messner (2009) and Roberts (2009) posit, the need for
an ethical and intelligent accountability that acknowledges the context in which an organisation must give an account, is
especially important for exposed organisations.
Finally, we note the extent to which accountability becomes problematic cannot be determined theoretically or a priori.
Messner (2009, p. 934), suggests that while ‘we can argue that responsibility with respect to the limits of accountability is
necessary, we cannot specify in advance what this responsibility entails and what form it takes. For what appears problem-
atic, disturbing, or ambiguous in the particular situation at hand can only be grasped in that very situation.’ In this sense, we
suggest future studies should attempt to understand how different situations can bring about a problematic accountability
and consider the particular nuances and effects this has on organisational practice. There is a rich agenda of research to be
continued in this area.
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Appendix A. Overview of organisations
NGOs A and B were established in the 1980’s as a direct response to the African famine and Bosnian crisis and currently
operate worldwide. NGO C was established in early 2000. Table a provides an overview of the income and expenditure of the
three organisations from 2010 to 2014.
Table a: Income and expenditure of the NGOs
£ (millions)
Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
NGO A
Income 64.35 82.31 100.38 82.81 99.14
Expenditure 60.21 76.30 96.15 87.28 92.39
NGO B
Income 25.16 33.41 24.79 26.68 34.66
Expenditure 21.31 31.90 28.17 26.57 31.26
NGO C
Income 0.61 0.47 0.72 0.73 0.63
Expenditure 0.51 0.51 0.76 0.71 0.57
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All organisations have headquarters in the UK, with their humanitarian efforts almost exclusively concentrated in the rest of
the world. All organisations also have a strong Islamic ethos which shapes their activities and mission, outlined in their offi-
cial core objectives. NGO A has close to 300 paid employees and over 700 volunteers worldwide. The board of trustees of
NGO A has 5 members who do not take part in the day to day running of the organisation. They have an appointed global
CEO, country-specific CEOs as well as global operational directors (i.e. Communications, Finance, HR etc.). This organisation
has over 25 field offices operating in Europe, Africa, Asia and the Middle East and operates in vital areas such as education,
disaster emergency relief, sustainable livelihoods, water solutions, orphan and child welfare etc. Within the UK they have
two main offices, one located in central London and one outside of the Capital. Table b provides a more detailed comparison
between organisation A and organisation B.
NGO B has 19 trustees, of whom a large majority are high-profile persons, able to actively promote the organisation in
their respective arenas. These trustees also take an active part in the organisation, with some trustees overseeing key inter-
nal committees. Many of their trustees are also trustees of numerous other organisations. They have approximately 60 paid
employees in the UK and over 1600 volunteers. This organisation has over 15 field offices operating in Asia, the Middle East
and Africa and provides much the same coverage as NGO A. Both organisations rely heavily on institutional funding, with
NGO A also having a large percentage of its income coming from its partner organisations overseas via voluntary donations.
Table b: Comparison of two larger NGOs
Organisation A Organisation B
Income* £99.1 million total £34.7 million
% of income from different
income streams*
Voluntary income – 79%2
Institutional funding – 15%
Government grants – 1.2%
Voluntary income – 47 %
Institutional funding – 34%
Government grants – 0%
No of project/institutional
funders
20 8
Type of activity1 1. Responding to emergencies
2. Caring for orphans and children in
need
3. Supporting education
4. Providing access to healthcare and
water
5. Promoting sustainable livelihood
6. Campaigning and advocacy on human-
itarian issues.
1. General charitable purposes
2. Education and training
3. The advancement of health or saving
of lives
4. Disability
5. The prevention or relief of poverty
6. Overseas aid/famine relief
7. Accommodation/housing
8. Economic/community develop-
ment/employment
9. Other charitable purposes
No of paid employees 370 110
No of volunteers 1600 1600
No of trustees 5 19
Who formulates strategy Board of directors Trustees
Role of trustees Governing body Governing body
Appointment basis of trustees Volunteering and nomination 16 trustees are founding trustees
The remaining three have been
nominated
*Income details taken from 2014 annual reports.
1Taken from Charity Commission website.
2Of which 60% come from international partners.
NGO A has a much larger income than NGOs B and C and also has a more diverse strategic focus. It is heavily focused on
advocacy issues and has made a concerted effort to develop itself in this role to make an impact on the wider international
development scene. As such the strategic policies of organisation A are more formalised and explicit compared to organisa-
tion B. Organisation B has not yet got to the stage of actively re-defining its strategic position. In contrast, NGO C is a smaller
organisation with four trustees and only 4 paid staff. Two trustees of the organisation take an active part in the running of
the organisation as CEO and accounts manager. The NGO operates primarily in South Asia and the Middle East, but also
engaged in emergency relief worldwide.
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Appendix B. Final coding matrix
First order codes Second order codes Aggregate dimensions
 Reporting a core process
 Importance of websites to highlight
accountability
 Importance of publishing reports with
Charity Commission
Reporting viewed as
transparency
Accountability is vital for organisational
survival
 Engagement with voluntary member-
ship bodies – following other similar
sized NGOs
 Seeking external verification/oversight
 Need to gain legitimacy from
funders/donors
Professionalising through
voluntary memberships
 Improving technological capacity to
meet government/funder
requirements
 Funder requirements seen as essential
to improving accounting processes
 Consequential costs a necessity
Prioritising upward accountor
requirements
 Right-wing media constantly critical
 negative media reporting influencing
relationship with Charity Commission
 Regulator being motivated by politics
Account is always incomplete
and viewed with scepticism
Creation of a problematic accountability
 Mistaken Charity Commission investi-
gations causing harm
 Lack of guidance on effect of various
legislative acts
Upward accountability
demands pervading
organisation on all levels
 Caught up in anti-terror concerns
 Legislation is counter-productive
Muslim NGOs have become
exposed organisations
 Unable to work in certain countries
due to sanctions/links with terror
 Uncertainty on territorial application
of legislation
 Cannot deal with gatekeepers on the
ground due to fear or ‘bribery’ charges
Affecting mission on ground Problematics of accountability in action:
effect on activities and operations
 Banks de-risking activities affecting
banking
 Cross-country fund transfers getting
difficult
Restriction on financial services
 Need to strengthen internal risk
assessment processes
 Lack of awareness around volunteer
collection risks
Strengthening internal risk
protocols
 Maintaining close relationship with
government
 Engaging with larger funder
partnerships
 Engaging closely with media
 Establishing PR departments.
Attempts to manage public
image
Negotiating and anticipating
accountability: steps towards building
trust and influence
 Engaging in internal strategic change
processes
 Undertaking advocacy activities
 Undertaking lobbying activities
Internal change processes
 Joining umbrella organisations like the
Muslim Charities Forum
Having voice heard
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Appendix C. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpa.2019.01.002.
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